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STATEMENT Of THE NAl'IJRE QF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with violation of Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, § 76-6-202, Burglary, a third degree
felony.

Appellant appeals from a conviction of that offense

in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County.

PISPQSITION IN

XH~

LOWER COURT

Appellant Miera was charged with violation of UCA,
1953,

§

76-6-202 (1953), Burglary, a third degree felony.

jury trial was held in Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, on March 8, 1982 before the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
where appellant was convicted as charged.
M~IEF

SOUGHT ON

APPEA~

Respondent, State of Utah, seeks an Order
affirming the conviction and judgment of the trial court.
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A

STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
On December 31, 1981, shortly before 2:00 a.m.,
Officer vantielen of the Salt Lake City Police Department
observed a broken window at an off ice building in Salt Lake
City.

Shortly thereafter the appellant was observed inside

the building (R.99).
Officer vantielen gained entrance to the building
and approached the defendant who was against the front door
of the business with his hands in the air (R.105).
The officer requested appellant to get down on his
stomach and appellant complied without hesitation (R.107).
Officer Vantielen testified that the defendant answered
questions with coherent speech, was responsive to questions
and appeared to be sober as the officer watched him walk.
The officer further testified that he did not smell the odor
of an alcoholic beverage about the defendant (R.114).
Upon searching the premises it was determined that
the defendant was alone CR.113) inside the building and that
he had a roll of stamps and a pen and pencil set in his
pockets (R.109).

These items were subsequently identified

by the owner of the building as having been taken from his
office CR.136-137).
Officer Vantielen also testified that after an
appropriate Miranda warning that the appellant said he had
taken the writing instruments and stamps out of a desk in
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one of the offices in the building CR.107-108,111).
Officer Green testified that he assisted Officer
Vantielen in the apprehension of the appellant CR.121-126),
and that he observed the appellant walk in a normal manner
CR.125).

This officer also indicated that the appellant was

alert and responsive to questions (T.125).
Mr. Richard Gordon, the owner of the building
CR.129), took the stand and testified that the stamps and
pens which had been found on the appellant's person were
taken from his (Gordon's) office CR.135-136).
Additionally, Mr. Gordon testified that items in
his off ice had been moved, including a radio which had been
unplugged and had the cord wrapped around it (R.137).

Mr.

Gordon also testified that he heard the officers ask the
appellant why he was in the building to which the appellant
answered, in substance, that he broke in because he needed
some money CR.142-143).
Mr. Gordon further testified that the appellant
did not appear to be intoxicated CR.143) and responded to
questions understandably and intelligently and did not
appear to have difficulty standing (R.141).
The appellant elected to take the stand and
testified about his toluene and alcohol usage CR.151-152).
Appellant admitted entering the building and admitted
throwing rocks through the window of the building and

-3-
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indicated that he remembered doing both acts CR.157-160).
Appellant's second witness was Dr. Bryan Finkle
who testified extensively and hypothetically about alcohol
and its physiological effects CR.168-193), but without any
personal knowledge of the appellant or the amount of alcohol
consumed by him CR.174-175).
Dr. Finkle testified that his expertise was .D.Q.t.
in the area of the effects of alcohol on

mentel functions

and that appellant's alleged level of intoxication would not
necessarily create unconsciousness or a blackout CR.188189,191).
Dr. Finkle also indicated that determining a
person's state of mind after consuming alcohol and sniffing
solvent was "far beyond" his "professional capacity" and
that alcohol can impair but not necessarily destroy mental
processes CR.191).
Following the testimony, appellant submitted three
instructions relating to the lesser-included offense of
criminal trespass CR.41-43).

The request for these

instructions was denied, and the court instructed the jury
as to the elements of burglary and on the issue of voluntary
intoxication (R.44-70).
Following trial defendant was convicted as charged
of burglary, a third degree felony.

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENl'
fQINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
Appellant was charged with burglary and the jury
instructed on the elements of that offense.

Appellant

contends that he was entitled to jury instructions on the
lesser included offense of criminal trespass.
This Court recently discussed in some detail the
issue of lesser included offenses and specifically discussed
the question of jury instructions relating to the offenses
of burglary and criminal trespass.
In state v.

Bsk~4,

671 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1983),

this Court held that, "The defendant's right to a lesser
included offense instruction is limited by the evidence
presented at trial."

.I..d. at 157.

Further amplication of

this standard was established by the Court in setting forth
the provisions of UCA, 1953,

§

76-1-402(4):

The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense •
.I.Q.. at 158.

This Court further indicated that, "The analysis
of whether an offense is included for purposes of deciding
whether to grant a defendant's request for a jury

-5-
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instruction must • • • begin with the proof of facts at
trial." .I.Q.. at 158.
Also, this Court clarified the application of this
standard by holding:
Under§ 76-1-402(4), the court is
obligated to instruct on the lesser
offense only if the evidence offered
provides a "rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the
included offense."
.l.Q.. at 159.

This Court also held in relation to a request for
a criminal trespass instruction that it is an offense which
requires specific intent.

.l.Q.. at 160.

Applying these standards, this Court held in
eaker, supra, that the evidence was not ambiguous or
subject to any alternative interpretation and the requested
criminal trespass instruction was not required.
The facts of

~skex,

supra and the case now

before the Court are remarkably similar.

In that case the

defendant was found inside a locked building and he did not
deny unlawful entry.

.I.Q.. at 160.

In the present case, the appellant admitted on
direct examination throwing rocks through the building
window and entering the building (R.157).

As in Saker,

supra, the appellant does not deny unlawful entry into the
building.

This leaves as the only disputed factual issue
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the intent of the appellant.
In order to receive an included offense
instruction, it must be shown that, first there is a
rational basis for acquittal of the charged offense .s.nQ.
conviction of the included offense.
Assuming arguendo that criminal trespass is an
included offense of burglary, the facts presented at trial
do not justify the giving of the "lesser included"
instructions.
Appellant argues that his conviction for criminal
trespass is supported by evidence of his recklessness.
Specifically, appellant asserts in his brief that " • • • he
acted with an awareness but disregard of the risks to any
potential persons inside the building."
page 8.)

(Appellant's Brief,

Appellant's testimony in this respect is extremely

equivocal.

At pages 156 and 157 of the record the following

exchange took place between appellant and his counsel:
Now, Fermin, did you have occasion to
pass a building at 254 west and First
south?
A Yes.
Q Do you know what that building is?
What was in there?
A Now I do.
I didn't then.
Q
You didn't then. Did you ever [sic]
that building?
A Yes.
Q
Do you remember entering it?
A Vaguel~,
But I--yeah.
I entered
Q

.J.t..

Do you remember throwing rocks
through the window?
A Yeah.
Q

-7-
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Were you aware that you were in the
building?
A No--yeah--yeah.
Q Do you want to explain that? To what
extent were you aware?
A Well, the cop came and busted me in
there. He had a--looked like a .38 in
my head now.
Q ~o, you were awat~ bec9yse the
o.tf icer;s CQJU~?
A I heard Jake Green yell. Yes.
Q Why did you enter the building,
Fermin?
A I don't know.
Q Why don't you know?
A aec~yse I w9sn't AW~re what was
ba12penin9.
Q
Why do you think you weren't aware?
A Because I was pretty loaded. I mean,
I was high.
(Emphasis added.)
Q

This testimony not only negates any specific intent but also
negates the "awareness" required for recklessness.
UCA, 1953,

§

76-2-103, defines recklessly as

follows:
A person engages in conduct: • • •
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct
when he is 9wate of but consciously
gisreg9rgs a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will
occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
(Emphasis added.)

In order to be "reckless" under the criminal
trespass statute, UCA, 1953

§

76-6-206, one must be shown to

be "reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for
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the safety of another."

Appellant testified he was not

aware of what was happening (R.157).
The appellant cites no evidence which shows that
he was reckless as to his presence in the business causing
fear for the safety of another.

No evidence was submitted

by the appellant which would show that he was even aware
that anyone was in the building.
that no one

else~

Indeed, the testimony was

in the building (R.113).

The record shows that the entry into the building
probably occurred in the early hours of the morning at
approximately 2:00 a.m. CR.98) when the presence of other
persons was most unlikely.
Applying the facts of this case to the standard
enunciated in Baker, supra, it is evident that those facts
do not justify the giving of a criminal trespass
instruction, for the reason that no evidence was presented
by the appellant which would justify a finding of either

specific intent or recklessness.
Since there is no denial of the unlawful entry,
the only remaining factual dispute is the appellant's
intent, which must be inf erred from circumstantial evidence.
St9te

~,

Baker, supra at 160.

Here the appellant claims

that his intoxication prevented him from forming the
requisite intent for a burglary conviction, but the evidence
relating to that claim is that the officers found the

-9-
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appellant not sufficiently enough impaired to prevent his
being able to hear, understand, communicate and walk without
significant impairment CR.114 and 125).

Also, Dr. Finkle

could not testify as to any aspect of intent and indeed
indicated that intoxication would not necessarily impair
intent.

( R.191) •

Just as in

eak~r,

supra, the thrust of the

appellant's testimony and evidence of intoxication was to
negate any specific intent, not towards proving one of the
requisite intents required for criminal trespass, set forth
in UCA, 1953,

§

76-6-206(1) and (2).

The issue of jury instructions as it relates to
burglary and criminal trespass was also addressed in State
Y.

eengrick~,

596 P.2d 633 (Utah, 1979), where this Court

held that the "defendants defense of lack of criminal intent
is totally inconsistent with his request for an instruction
on criminal trespass." ig_. at 634.
While acknowledging defendant's right to have his
theory of the case presented to the jury, this Court in
Hgndrick§, supra, also held:
However, the right is not absolute, and
a defense theory must be supported by a
certain quantum of evidence before an
instruction as to an included offense
need be given •
.I.Q.. at 634.

The evidence presented at trial does not justify
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the giving of a criminal trespass instruction because that
evidence does not provide a rational basis for a verdict of
acquittal of burglary nor does that eviaence provide a
rational foundation upon which a verdict of guilty could be
returned for the offense of criminal trespass.fQINt II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION.
Appellant claims that the trial court refused to
include the negation of the affirmative defense of
intoxication as an element which the State was required to
prove.

In fact, however, the trial court did clearly set

out the burden of the State with respect to the affirmative
defense of voluntary intoxication.
Appellant has asserted that the jury could have
been confused in connection with the Court's giving of
Instruction No. 12 and Instruction No. 13 on the issue of
voluntary intoxication and the State's burden in connection
with this defense.

Appellant's apparently inadvertant

reference to Instructions 12 and 13 is confusing since those
instructions CR.53 and 54) relate to witnesses, resolving
conflicting evidence, circumstantial and direct evidence.
Those instructions bear no relationship to the defense of
voluntary intoxication.
The trial court specifically instructed the jury

-11-
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regarding this defense in Instruction No. 23 CR. 64).

This

Instruction provides:
In this case the defendant has raised
the defense of voluntary intoxication.
Once this defense is raised the State
has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the degree of
intoxication at the time in question did
not destroy his ability to form the
necessary intent required for the crime
in question.
It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of
the State's burden as to the defense of voluntary
intoxication.

No ambiguity or confusion is reasonably

possible on this issue.
State

~.

This is unlike the situation in

to,res, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah, 1980) where the trial

court failed to give an appropriate instruction concerning
the burden of proof when an affirmative defense is raised.
In UDiteg States y,

~Ot{ig90,

548 F.2d 879 (10th

Cir. 1977) the Court held, in relation to instructing the
jury on affirmative defenses that:
The question is whether the
instructions, taken as a whole,
adequately informed the jury that the
prosecution's burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt applied to defendant's
affirmative defense •
.I.Q.. at 882.

The Court also held:
We are ItQ,t. saying the burden of proof
should be rgiterated in each seBarate
instruction •
.I.Q.. at 883

(emphasis added).
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Following the Instruction listed above, the Court
then gave Instruction No. 24 CR. 65) , which instructs
further on the defense of voluntary intoxication.

This

instruction sets forth the nature of this defense and is
couched in the precise terms of the voluntary intoxication
statute, UCA, 1953,

§

76-2-306.

Further, the trial court immediately followed up
with Instruction No. 25 CR. 66) which established the
elements of the crime of burglary, including the requisite
intent.

The required burden of proof was set forth and

acquittal was directed if all elements were not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court's Instruction Nos. 23, 24 and 25 CR. 64,
65 and 66) do not require the jury to engage in the

"tortious process" condemned in Iarres, supra, to
establish and define the burden on the State, but rather
clearly set forth the elements of the offense and obligation
of the State.
This Court in

~orrep,

purpose of jury instructions.

supra, indicated the
This Court held:

The purpose of the instructions is to
set forth the issues and the law
applicable thereto in a clear, concise
and orderly manner, so that the jury
will understand how to discharge its
responsibilities •

.l.d.... at 696.
This purpose was fully and adequately discharged
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the Court's instructions in all respects and particularly
with regard to appellant's voluntary intoxication defense.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly refused to give the
appellant's lesser included criminal trespass instruction in
that the evidence presented did not justify such an
instruction.

Further, the Court fully and accurately

instructed the jury on the issue of voluntary intoxication.
Respectfully submitted this
April, 1984.
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Governmental Affairs
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